Static Dalvik VM bytecode instrumentation by Minibaev, Eugene
Автономная некоммерческая Autonomous noncommercial
организация высшего organization of higher
образования education
«Университет Иннополис» «Innopolis University»
ВЫПУСКНАЯ КВАЛИФИКАЦИОННАЯ РАБОТА
ПО НАПРАВЛЕНИЮ ПОДГОТОВКИ
09.03.01 — «ИНФОРМАТИКА И ВЫЧИСЛИТЕЛЬНАЯ ТЕХНИКА»
GRADUATE THESIS
MAJOR: "COMPUTER SCIENCE"
Тема: Статическая инструментация байткода виртуальной машины Dalvik
Topic: Static Dalvik VM bytecode instrumentation
Работу выполнил / Минибаев Евгений Маратович /
Thesis is executed by Eugene Minibaev Maratovich подпись / signature
Научный руководитель / Нестор Катано Коллазос /
Thesis supervisor Ne´stor Catan˜o Collazos подпись / signature
Иннополис, Innopolis, 2017
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
06
92
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 Ju
n 2
01
7

Contents
List of figures 3
1 Abstract 5
2 Introduction 6
3 Background theory 8
3.1 Android Application structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3 Android Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4 Messaging system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5 Activity lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.6 Manifest Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.7 Android system architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.8 Dex files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4 Results 14
4.1 Steal the Zygote work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2 The process substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3 Application repacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.4 Implementation dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5 Related Work 16
6 Future Work 17
A Methods signatures of c 20
B Stub geneneration based on dex 21
3
List of Figures
2.1 Mobile OS market share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Android APK structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 Activity Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3 Application launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4 JAR and APK comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4
Chapter 1
Abstract
This work proposes a novel approach to restricting the access for black-
listed Android system API calls. Main feature of the suggested method in-
troduced in this paper is that it requires only rootless or (user-mode) access
to the system unlike previous works. For that reason this method is valuable
for end-users due to the possibility of project distribution via Play Market
and it does not require any phone system modifications and/or updates. This
paper explains the required background of Android OS necessary for under-
standing and describes the method for modification Android application. In
this paper the proof-of-concept implementation. That is able to block the
application’s IMEI requests is introduced. Also this paper lists unsuccessful
methods that tried to provide the user security. Obviously with those re-
strictions application may lack some of features that can only be granted in
unsecured environment.
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Chapter 2
Introduction
For the past 8 years Google, Inc and Open Handset Alliance confidently
remain undisputed leaders in the market of mobile operating systems. In the
middle of the 2016 their well-known product named Android has almost 90%
of mobile OS market share Figure 2.1 sold to the end users as for 2015 there
were nearly 14˙ billion active devices working under this operating system [6].
Therefore it is essential to be ensured in the quality of the security and user
experience of that platform.
Figure 2.1: Mobile OS market share
One of the important features of this platform is that anyone can create
and distribute applications with the instruments and libraries provided by
the Android ecosystem. Developers can implement their apps with either
Java (SDK) or C/C++ (NDK) development kits and then distribute it via
the Google Play.
Obviously most of the applications will be useless if they cannot be able
to work with the personal data and Android platform isn’t an exception.
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As long as developers make mistakes that implies the problem of improper
handling of that important data. Some studies show that it often takes the
place in the real world applications [8] [10].
Another aspect of that issue is that developers usually require more access
than their application really needs. Despite the attempts to connect seman-
tic purpose of the application and the requested permissions[16], the reality
shows that meta information of the application usually is not enough [5].
From user’s perspective it may seem that some instant messenger ap-
plications, which requires for their work the camera and the SMS reading
permissions, don’t seem legitimate. But still those can be used in the proper
way. For example the camera permission may improve the quality of the
photo and SMS reading permission may be used for the account authentica-
tion. Therefore it seems impossible (or almost impossible) to distinguish the
malicious and benign permissions.
User decision can be taken into account as a possible solution for that
problem. But the problem is that Android doesn’t have such possibilities.
The solution proposed in this paper presents a technique that gives a user
the possibility to deny selected permissions of the application.
The chapter of Background theory presents essential technical informa-
tion required for complete understanding of the solution. The following chap-
ter of Results presents the output of the research and describes the imple-
mented proof of concept. As long as the area of the Android security is not
new, the last chapter of Related Works discusses the similar works that have
been done on this subject or somehow bounded to this issue. The possible
consequences for research on this subject is in the last chapter Future Works.
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Chapter 3
Background theory
3.1 Android Application structure
Every Android application is a APK zip archive similar to Java jar files.
You can see its contents at the Figure 3.1. This files are distributed via
official Google Play application that is installed with the OS.
Figure 3.1: Android APK structure
The main code of the application is placed to the classes.dex file. This is
a special bytecode file format that is supposed to run on the Dalvik Virtual
Machine. It consists of the compiled .class files that are built on the Java
code and are represented in more a optimized way. It is also possible to
write a native code in C/C++ languages with the Android NDK. Finally the
code is compiled in the Linux shared libraries (.so files) and placed to the lib
directory. The last one is assessed via Java Native Interface (JNI) same as
in usual Java.
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The AndroidManifest.xml contains meta information of the packages in
binary XML format. This, for example, includes the main Activity class and
permissions information. The same way as in the jar files the META-INF
contains signatures and hashes of the files in the archive.
The res and assets directory contains resources data and resources.arsc,
and the meta information of both.
3.2 Resources
The developers of Android application can use resources for extraction of the
application data and to ease the development process. Those are written
in the XML format and may contain some constants, graphics, application
layouts, etc. All the access in the code is performed via fixed class R similar
to Java static field access in form R.<type>.<name>, e.g: R.string.my-
string. During the compilation the compilation types created as nested
classes of R, and the access is exactly as to the static field.
3.3 Android Components
Android application is built on one or more components. There are four
types of such building blocks [13]:
• Activities is the entry point for the main interacting interface with the
user. It represents a single screen with a user interface.
• Services is a general-purpose entry point for keeping an app running in
the background for all kinds of reasons. It is a component that runs in
the background to perform long-running operations or to perform work
for remote processes. A service does not provide a user interface.
• Broadcast Receivers is a component that enables the system to deliver
events to the app outside of a regular user flow, allowing the app to
respond to system-wide broadcast announcements.
• Content Providers manages a shared set of app data that applications
can store in the file system, in a SQLite database, on the web, or on
any other persistent storage location that app can access.
3.4 Messaging system
Android OS provides a quite complicated communication system between
components. It is called an Intent. It is simply a message that contain an
9
address and data for transmission. These message objects can be used both
for inner- and inter-application communication. Besides those variants such
messages can be sent by operating system.
3.5 Activity lifecycle
Figure 3.2: Activity Lifecycle
In the application there may be many entry points and all of them
are independent. The overall developing concept is reactive that means the
application should react on the events via callbacks. Some of them are on-
Create, onPause, onDestroy and the rest is presented at Figure 3.2. In
other words the Activity flow represents a state machine where the transi-
tions are events and the states are callbacks provided by developers and they
are executed on the event. From this flow it is also important to mention
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that the application is notified when they’re going to suspend and resume
unlike in other popular OSes.
The application launch can be performed via corresponding system call
with some predefined intent messages. This also includes an example of the
user interaction with launching apps via menu application.
3.6 Manifest Permissions
For performing system calls the Android OS provides the permission sys-
tem. During the installation a user sees the requested permissions and can
decide whether to accept them and install the application, or to deny those
requests. This list of such requirements is placed to the AndroidManifest.xml
file.
There is a big list of system permissions. In addition developers can also
define their own. All of them are divided into four protection levels [14]:
• Normal permissions cover areas where app needs to access data or re-
sources outside the app’s sandbox, but where there’s very little risk to
the user’s privacy or the operation of other apps. The system automat-
ically grants the permission of that level to the app.
• Dangerous permissions cover areas where the app wants data or re-
sources that involve the user’s private information, or could potentially
affect the user’s stored data or the operation of other apps. Those ones
are granted after user confirmation.
• Signature permission that the system grants only if the requesting ap-
plication is signed with the same certificate as the application that
declared the permission.
• Signature or system permission that the system grants only to applica-
tions that are in the Android system image or that are signed with the
same certificate as the application that declared the permission.
One of the problems with the permissions is that they should be either
applied all at once, or nothing at all. So a user cannot accept only some
pieces of these requests. The developers of the Android OS also understand
this problem. But because they are very limited in the modification of the
architecture they cannot change a lot.
Despite the beginning with the Android 6.0 developers can ask for some
required permissions in runtime [1]. But it is still not really practical for two
reasons. Firstly, due to platform version compatibility developers still may
write the code in the old way and ask all required permissions during the
installation. The second problem is that only nearly a third [2] of all existing
devices is able to use runtime permissions.
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3.7 Android system architecture
Android operating system is a number of components built on the modified
Linux kernel and most of the features of Linux derived to that mobile OS.
Also Android developers was very mindful about the architectural design of
the platform in general and so this platform is one of the most secure from
the user’s perspective [11].
Figure 3.3: Application launch
All applications are separated from each other. This is enforced by DAC
(Discretionary Access Control) from Linux kernel by assigning each app
unique user and private directory. Besides every application is running in
its own copy of Dalvik VM (or DVM) [9]. DVM is an alternative to Java
virtual machine for the dex bytecode. The process that copies such VMs is
called Zygote. Its job is to perform Linux fork() system call and pass the
control to the app. An overall controlling is performed via ActivityManager.
You can find more complete application launch system flow at the Figure 3.3.
3.8 Dex files
The class.dex files represents the code of the application in the Dalvik byte-
code format. It can be compared to .class Java bytecode files. The dex file
is actually excluded from many .class files (Figure 3.4) in a more optimized
way, because strings don’t need to be duplicated in one file.
The dex file consists of a header, the following table of strings, class
definitions, and then indexes. The instructions of Dalvik bytecode are based
on these indexes. So if we want to search for some function MyClass.func.
We need to search for a class definition of MyClass in the method list. And
then based on an index in that list and in the method table to find the method
that maps to string “func”. The code example that can traverse these tables
12
Figure 3.4: JAR and APK comparison
and print method signature of the class you can find at Appendix A. The
real instruction of the bytecode work with the index in the method list.
opcode prefix instruction size
invoke-virtual 0x6e 6 bytes
invoke-super 0x6f 6 bytes
invoke-direct 0x70 6 bytes
invoke-static 0x71 6 bytes
invoke-interface 0x72 6 bytes
invoke-virtual/range 0x74 6 bytes
invoke-super/range 0x75 6 bytes
invoke-direct/range 0x76 6 bytes
invoke-static/range 0x77 6 bytes
Table 3.1: invoke bytecode listing
The function call is performed via invoke-kind opcode family. It is im-
portant to mention that all invoke-kind bytecode instructions have the same
size: Table 3.1. So after patching method call with other type of invoke code
doesn’t need to be re-aligned and resulted bytes remains the same. The
patching in proof-of-concept is implemented in the such way.
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Chapter 4
Results
The main research was held in the area of giving the user a possibility of
limiting the application permissions requests. One of the interesting points
of Android is that it doesn’t forbid access to the installed application code
as well as listing installed application. Therefore it is possible to modify
the code of the specified application. After researching the operating system
main possible scenarios have been discovered:
• Steal the Zygote work: perform fork and then app loading to the new
process
• The process substitution: loading of the application and substitution
of the current process with the new one
• Application repacking and reinstalling
All of these methods include the APK loading, searching for the dangerous
calls and patching them with the secure versions. The following sections
describe the results of each method.
The other issue that occurred is that because the code in fact is a memory
mapped structure comprising the whole code of the application, it is not
possible to modify the code of a class dynamically. In fact, because of the
second constraint, it would be hard to modify a single class anyway, without
modifying the code of the other classes. Therefore the modification of the
bytecode cannot be performed on the already launched code.
4.1 Steal the Zygote work
Because all application start with the different users and therefore run in the
unaccessible memory we cannot directly modify the running application data.
So the essential way of launching tampered application code is a becoming a
Zygote itself. As long as the work of the Zygote is quite simple it shouldn’t
be difficult.
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Unfortunately fork() is not recommended for usage for user processes
because it is internal API. The consequent issue with the application loading
is described in the following section.
4.2 The process substitution
If we cannot create new processes for the tampered application we can still
attempt to load the code and to pass all the callbacks to the new instance of
Activity.
In practice this is also a hard way because it should initialize the private
members of Activity instance and the thread information. Also there is a
good probability of collision resource classes during the loading.
4.3 Application repacking
As long as more “dynamic” methods don’t work or are too complicated the
last (fortunately successful) attempt was the repacking of the application and
its following re-installation.
The flow of this idea is pretty simple. Firstly, it should find the requested
apk file of the installed package. The second stage is analyzing the classes.dex
file and generating required stub methods. If we want to forbid Telephony-
Manager.getDeviceId that gets the IMEI of the phone we need to generate
the static method with the same return parameter, for this example it should
return java.lang.String, it’s not really necessary to handle function param-
eters in general if the finite aim is to forbid calls.
The proof-of-concept code can be found at https://github.com/l4l/bs-
thesis. The code architectural structure is the simplest possible. The Ap-
kLoader is the main package that is able to patch, repack and sign the pack-
ages. Bytecode patching is performed via MethodBuffer class. This class
works with the given buffer of dex file and performs patching method calls.
Obviously this work is far from ideal, for example simple obfuscation
techniques don’t allow to perform such kind of modifications.
4.4 Implementation dependencies
The Android platform has a nice tool for merging bunch of class files to the
dex file. Because it also has an implementation of bytecode generation that
was enough for implementing the patching and repacking. The bytecode gen-
eration example of stub class and empty method is provided in Appendix B.
The other additional library is zipsigner, so it is possible to perform the
signing.
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Chapter 5
Related Work
The area of the research was pretty wide so it includes the many areas of the
topic. Beginning with the basic communication analysis vulnerabilities [8]
and ending with enforcement security via kernel modification [12][4].
The other way is a dynamic approach that is presented in Aurasium pa-
per [18]. They propose enforcing policies via system calls hooking. Their
work is based on the insertion of the arbitrary native library to the APK file
so the framework is able to enforce the policies. The enforcement is based on
the rewriting the main Application class.
Similar proposal was in the FireDroid papaer [15]. Their work was some
kind of firewall between the applications and the system calls that works
over the ptrace() system call. The further job is done by the monitor that
attaches to apps and checks the policy statements.
Also there is a work that combines both statical and dynamic analysis
methods [7]. It also acts as a monitor. But firstly it performs the static
analysis and constructs Permission Event Graph, based on which all the
work is done.
The other approach is an enforcement of the system rather than the ap-
plications. Some of those techniques were presented in [17]. This work intro-
duces SeApp application that performs an app instrumentation for tracking
the inter-component communications.
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Chapter 6
Future Work
The possible future research for this topic covers many aspects. As long as
this paper proposes the proof-of-concept code there is no entire listing in the
app of potentially dangerous calls. This is not an easy task because although
the Android project is open-sourced, a lot of API didn’t documented [3]
Beside that the additional feature for this method will be improving the
speed of patching. Because the patching is based on merging 2 dex files it can
take some time for this process. Therefore a ways for improving this method
possibly exist.
Also the newer version of the DVM allow to use multidex format, so that
the code could be placed in multiple classes.dex files.
Because the most recent version of the Android prefers to use ART instead
of DVM the continuations of the work is the performing patching of the native
libraries.
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Appendix A
Methods signatures of c
// type poo l o f i n t e rna l−r epre sen t ed s t r i n g s
List<Str ing> tnames = dexFi l e . typeNames ( ) ;
// type indexes
List<Integer> types = dexFi l e . typeIds ( ) ;
// s t r i n g s t a b l e
List<Str ing> s t r i n g s = dexFi l e . s t r i n g s ( ) ;
// f i e l d indexes
List<Fie ldId> f i e l d s = dexFi l e . f i e l d I d s ( ) ;
// pro to t ype s indexes
List<ProtoId> protos = dexFi l e . p ro to Ids ( ) ;
// method indexes
List<MethodId> methods = dexFi l e . methodIds ( ) ;
for ( Method m : c . methods ( ) ) {
int i = m. getMethodIndex ( ) ;
MethodId id = methods . get ( i ) ;
S t r ing n = s t r i n g s . get ( id . getNameIndex ( ) ) ;
ProtoId proto = protos . get ( id . getProtoIndex ( ) ) ;
S t r ing r e t = tnames . get ( proto . getReturnTypeIndex ( ) ) ;
short types = dexFi l e . readTypeList (
proto . ge tParameter sOf f se t ( ) ) . getTypes ( ) ) ;
p r i n t ( r e t + ” ” + n + ” ( ” ) ;
for ( short t : types )
p r i n t ( tnames . get ( t ) + ” ” ) ;
p r i n t ( ” ) ” ) ;
}
20
Appendix B
Stub geneneration based
on dex
public <T> void generateMethod ( St r ing name , Type<T> ret , Type . . . params ) {
Type<?> stub = Type . get ( ”Lru/ i n n o p o l i s /Stub ; ” ) ;
MethodId methodId = stub . getMethod ( ret , name , params ) ;
Code code = generato r . d e c l a r e ( methodId ,
Modi f i e r .STATIC | Modi f i e r .PUBLIC ) ;
i f ( r e t . equa l s (Type .VOID) ) {
code . returnVoid ( ) ;
} else {
MethodId<T, Void> c t r = r e t . getConstructor ( ) ;
Local<T> r = code . newLocal ( r e t ) ;
code . newInstance ( r , c t r ) ;
code . returnValue ( r ) ;
}
}
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